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Introduction 
All research is philosophy in action. A lack of attention to and understanding of 
philosophy can render research and its outcomes misleading or vacuous. Understanding 
philosophical questions, on the other hand, can help information systems (IS) 
researchers ensure their work is rigorous and insightful. It can also improve the quality 
of the work itself (Lee, 2004). These are strong statements. In this editorial of the 
special issue on philosophy and the future of IS we develop arguments to support them, 
review the current state of philosophy in IS and put forward a research agenda. First, we 
need to justify this focus on philosophy that motivates the special issue.  
In order to undertake any sort of research, the researcher needs to answer a number of 
philosophical questions that precede the research. These include questions such as: 
What am I researching? What does it mean to know? What is knowledge? How can I 
create knowledge? What is truth and is it important? What exists and can be described? 
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Are the consequences of my research acceptable? Is it right for me to ask the question? 
How can I communicate my insights? Who am I? Who is my audience and who are the 
people using IS? These questions may lead to other questions. What does “use” mean? 
And does “use” cover most of technology’s effects? What about people who do not use 
those technologies but are impacted regardless. 
Researchers in the field of IS, just like those in many other fields, tend to have implicit, 
taken-for-granted answers to these questions that are unacknowledged, and often 
broadly shared and agreed upon. It is important to acknowledge that such questions are 
typically open to many different types of answers and that successful research requires 
them to be addressed in a consistent manner. To do so, one needs to have an 
understanding of the field or discipline that deals with them, namely philosophy. This 
need for a philosophical grounding of research may explain why the highest degree that 
universities in many English-speaking countries confer is that of a Doctor of Philosophy 
(PhD). Researchers holding such a degree can therefore rightly be expected to display a 
significant awareness of philosophy. But what is it, this mysterious thing we call 
philosophy? 
The literal meaning of philosophy is the “love of wisdom or knowledge” (Greek philo- 
“loving” + sophia- “wisdom”). In its current incarnation philosophy is typically seen as 
an academic discipline, part of the broader canon of the humanities. One can study 
philosophy at many universities. When doing so, the student of philosophy will 
typically be taught many of the sub-disciplines of philosophy including metaphysics, 
logic, ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, philosophy of language, political philosophy and 
many others. These different sub-disciplines ask particular questions and have more or 
less clearly defined subject areas that cover many of the questions listed earlier. A basic 
understanding of at least some of these fields is thus required for an IS researcher to be 
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able to justify their work and approach.  
While this view of philosophy as an academic discipline is appropriate and represents 
the current state of affairs, we would like to point to a broader and older understanding 
of philosophy. When the term came up with the ancient Greeks, epitomized by great 
philosophers such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the term covered the entire field of 
knowledge and was thus closer to what we now might call “science” or “research”. 
Most, if not all, academic disciplines as we know them today can be traced back to 
philosophy: physics, biology, chemistry and other sciences are all embodied in classics 
like Newton’s (1687) Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and Lord 
Kelvin’s et al (1888) Treatise of Natural Philosophy. Going beyond such natural 
sciences, philosophy in a broader understanding did not only have the purpose of 
organizing knowledge in a particular domain, but also to inform individuals and 
societies about how to live their lives and achieve the “good life”. This was typically 
seen as a life spent perfecting oneself, including the development of knowledge, being 
part of a commonwealth, and having positive relationships with others in the pursuit of 
the optimum state of being that could be achieved, individually and collectively.  
We do not want to overly romanticize the antique Greek way of life where slavery and 
the subjugation of women and foreigners were commonly accepted. It is furthermore 
clear that in modern pluralistic societies it will be more difficult, if not impossible, to 
find answers to such grand questions. This does not mean, however, that one cannot or 
should not ask these questions. Even a failure to find a shared answer can provide 
insights and shed light on the specific research one has undertaken and the results it has 
led to. Such insights help us individually and collectively to answer the question why 
we are doing research and how academic and other investigations position us in society.  
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We believe that a desire to gain this type of understanding is at the heart of the interest 
in philosophy. Not only can philosophy help us understand the basis of our research 
questions, methodologies and findings but, more importantly, it can help us locate 
ourselves and our research in a greater context. Research may remain anaemic and 
superficial if it does not consider the wider context and the question, “What role can IS 
play as a practice and as an academic discipline?” Achievements within the discipline 
are worthwhile, but how those achievements transcend across into the constellation of 
other disciplines answers those more intimate questions concerning which role I, as an 
individual researcher, can and should play. We therefore see this special issue and its 
focus on philosophy and IS as part of the discourse that tries to give an answer to 
Walsham’s (2012) question, are we using IS to make the world a better place? While we 
may not reach a consensus in answering this question, we nevertheless believe that 
addressing this question serves as the aspiration of science and research. This aspiration, 
if taken seriously, requires a modicum of philosophical insights. In the end, if there is 
any doubt concerning the need for philosophy and its relevance for IS, let this editorial 
provide some answers. 
Philosophical Interventions in the IS Discourse 
“The Weaponization of Information: The Need for Cognitive Security”, thus ran the title 
of a testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on 
Cybersecurity, on April 27, 2017 by Rand Waltzman, representative of the Rand 
Corporation, a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges 
in the United States. For a field like IS that has the term “information” in its title and is 
concerned about the well-being and security of organizations, this would certainly fall 
within its purview. However, what is being discussed in this testimony falls outside the 
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IS field’s traditional notions of what information is about: information for decision 
making, automation and effective control of organizations. Information, in this case, is 
being used to disrupt and break down decision making and create havoc within 
organizations rather than support them. In the wake of the disclosure that Steve Bannon 
was also the co-founder of the political analytics company, Cambridge Analytica, that 
was hired to help the Trump campaign (Frenkel, 2018), the dark underbelly of 
technology has never been so exposed, such that the US Senate are talking about the 
need to regulate information in the same way financial institutions and utilities are 
regulated (Stewart, 2018). The use of information as weapons is not new. During the 
Second World War, the “Ghost Army” (Garber, 2013) of the allies fooled the Nazis 
using inflatable tanks and airplanes, and sent to the front lines recordings of the sounds 
of moving armoured infantry units to scare them into retreat. After Caesar’s 
assassination, Octavian, Caesar’s adopted son, began a vicious program of 
disinformation and fake news against Mark Antony who claimed succession, which 
eventually helped Octavian defeat Mark Antony and transform him into Augustus, the 
first Emperor of Rome (Kaminska, 2018). Given today’s reification of information 
through technology and even greater potential for negative consequences not only on 
organizations but also socio-political life, studies of such use of information should 
feature prominently in IS. Although in the past IS researchers have drawn from 
philosophy for their studies, the full repertoire of philosophical inventiveness is yet to 
be explicitly applied, especially for those intractable problems mentioned. 
Following the general argument why IS scholars should take philosophy seriously, we 
also need to consider how philosophical work is represented and perceived in the IS 
discourse. This is an important question for researchers who have to make decisions 
about the use of their time and resources and need to ask how best to focus their 
 6 
research. It is therefore important to understand whether a philosophical focus can be 
rewarded.  When reflecting on this question, it is important to point out that even in 
established mainstream IS research there is strong evidence of the relevance of 
philosophy and of a broad recognition of this relevance. The IS tradition has produced a 
long list of highly-cited works, in its top journals indicating that philosophical work in 
IS has high visibility and can be considered highly successful (see Hevner et al. (2004), 
Benbasat et al. (1987), Klein and Myers (1999), Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), 
Walsham (1995), Lee (1989) and Mingers (2001) in epistemology; Mason and Mitroff 
(1973), Orlikowski and Iacono (2001) and Gregor (2006) in metaphysics; Markus and 
Robey (1988) in rationality). This tradition is evidence that philosophical work is not 
only intrinsically important as we argued earlier, but it can also stand up in terms of 
some of the more established research metrics to other types of IS research. Having 
provided some evidence that philosophical work can find its way into highly regarded 
IS outlets, we can now look in more detail into different areas of philosophy and the 
way these are represented in IS and where future research might lead. 
Philosophical questions in IS: history, current work and 
research agendas 
In this section we want to move beyond the general overview offered earlier and 
develop a research agenda that highlights the importance of philosophical inquiry and 
demonstrates how such inquiry can promote the field of IS. The field of philosophy is 
broad and all research has philosophical roots and implications in many ways. We 
therefore do not aim for a comprehensive coverage of all aspects of philosophy but we 
focus on those areas that we believe to be most likely to be of theoretical or practical 
relevance. We use this section to give an overview of some of the key works in the 
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relevant sub-fields or disciplines of philosophy and to locate the contribution that the 
papers in this special issue make to those streams of discussion. From this position then 
we extrapolate next steps and further research. Overall, we hope that this approach 
contributes to a broader research agenda of philosophy in IS that can further promote 
the visibility and relevance of this type of research. 
We focus on four well-established fields of philosophy (Teichman & Evans, 1995). 
However, we are aware that the division of philosophy into fields or sub-disciplines are 
somewhat arbitrary. In practice different philosophical questions are strongly 
interlinked and a commitment to one particular position in one field often implies 
corresponding commitment in other fields. The following sections highlight those 
aspects of philosophy in IS that in our opinion either have been covered significantly in 
the past or deserve more attention in the future. We use this discussion to locate the 
contributions in the special issue in the broader context of philosophy and IS. 
Table 1: The Main Fields in Philosophy and Questions They Address 
Main field Important questions relevant to IS 
Metaphysics Ontology – what exists and what properties do they have? 
Causation – what is the nature of causality? 
The mind – what is the relation of the mind to the body? 
Sociomateriality – is the social world intrinsically different to 
the material world? 
Technology – what is the relation between the social and the 
technological? 
Information – does it exist and what is its nature? 
Epistemology 
 
What is the nature of knowledge? 
How do we gain knowledge? 
How does language (and its concepts and meanings) construct 
knowledge? 
What is truth? 
How do we ensure that knowledge is valid? 
Are there fundamentally different paradigms of research? 
What methodologies produce valid knowledge? 
Rationality 
 
What is it to be rational? 
Logic – how should we reason and make valid arguments? 
Theory – what is a good theory? 




Value – what is good and to be valued? 
Ethics/morality – how should we behave? 
Aesthetics – what is beauty, art, taste? 
Politics – how should we govern and regulate our communities? 
Metaphysics: The First Philosophy 
Aristotle (1998) began his treatise on metaphysics with the statement: “All men by 
nature desire to know” to describe the inherent force that urges, to varying degrees, all 
of us towards knowledge. With that phrase, Aristotle embarks on his strongest argument 
for wisdom (sophiaWKHORYHIRULW*UHHNĳȚȜȠıȠĳȓĮ– philosophia) and for nurturing 
the capacity within us to learn and understand. He argues that if the knowledge pursued 
was for control or to be published, it would not be a desire for knowledge; it would be 
for the will to control or to be noted. Mathematics was founded in Egypt not for these 
reasons; it was founded by a priestly caste who pursued knowledge for its own sake 
(Lear, 1988). Aristotle’s metaphysics sought to explain the nature of wisdom, 
philosophy and how to acquire it. In other words, according to metaphysics, our 
research should be inspired by wonder, awe, puzzlement and the honest pursuit for 
explanations for their own sake. Hence the description of metaphysics as “first 
philosophy,” the beginning of all things, physical or otherwise, including knowledge 
itself. As first philosophy, metaphysics comes before science (episteme) and the study 
of it (epistemology). 
What does all this mean to IS research? The history of metaphysics in key disciplines 
provides some answers. When the father of modern philosophy, Descartes (1644/1983; 
1641/2014), wrote Meditations on First Philosophy and later Principles of Philosophy, 
he offered an alternative metaphysics to that of Aristotle while, at the same time, 
applied Aristotle’s own methods. As Spinoza (1663/1961) explains, the Cartesian first 
principles of rejecting pre-conceived notions, searching for the bases of everything, 
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discovering the cause of error, understanding everything clearly and distinctly, would 
become the foundations of modern science for centuries after. Essentially Descartes led 
the way to natural philosophy and the sciences by asking the “What is …?” question. 
What is the nature of reality? What is the body? What is the mind? These are not 
questions that we can find in the sciences because unlike the science, they do not target 
qualities, features or characteristic of objects. They are questions that concern what 
Aristotle described as the substance or the essence of the object, which cannot be 
separated from it if it is to remain the same object. Descartes’ (1630, p. 15) took the 
route that led him to have “discovered the foundations of physics” in essence as a 
mechanistic system, which Newton would later complete. Most of the sciences we 
know of began with similar metaphysical questions. Even as a naturalist himself, 
Darwin (1859) asked the question, “What is the Natural System?” His re-examination of 
the essence of his object of study would lead to one of the most influential and 
controversial theories in history. Schrödinger’s (1945) What is Life? inspired Watson to 
discover the structure of DNA. The fecundity of the “What is …?” question is legend. 
Except for several notable exceptions (Mason & Mitroff, 1973; Schwartz, 2011; 
Mingers & Standing, 2017; Aakhus et al., 2014), such a path is not taken by mainstream 
IS research. 
Most research in information system will either begin with qualities and characteristics 
of objects of study already laid out by other disciplines, with very little contemplation of 
the metaphysics of “information” or of “system.” For example, the investigation of the 
success of an information system would take a different trajectory if it began with 
questioning the essence of “success” rather than enumerating and investigating its 
secondary characteristics. The inspiration behind the most prolific research theory in IS, 
the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), was the good decade of effort by Fishbein 
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and Ajzen (Fishbein, 1961; Fishbein, 1963; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1972) to answer the 
question “What is attitude?” The attention given to this metaphysical question does not 
mean research cannot proceed at the same time, for example, on how attitude impacts 
overt behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). But the foundations of what constitutes 
attitude are not left in doubt. Research that adopted this theory in IS stripped it of its 
major elements (Davis, 1986), very little attention was afforded to what attitude entails 
within the context of the IS field. The foundations of the core concerns of the IS field, 
information, system and technology, remain in doubt (Lee, 2010) in part because 
metaphysical questions are not addressed. 
Of course, just as Descartes transformed Aristotle’s views, metaphysics itself will 
continue to evolve. In the 20th century, Heidegger, following his teacher Husserl, 
mounted the most vigorous critique of Cartesian metaphysics, questioning the 
separation between subject and object, body and mind. Heidegger’s phenomenological 
view explains that for the most part we deal with the world in an absorbed, non-
deliberative way, not as Cartesian dualism claims. Thus, Heidegger brings the question 
of metaphysics back to Aristotle’s study of “being qua being,” that is studying being not 
with a particular end or purpose in mind as it is done in the sciences, but studying being 
as it is in itself, placing how we encounter things in this world as being-in-the-world, 
not as separate, predefined entities. For IS research, these varied interpretations of 
metaphysics provide a rich foundation for developing the field’s own metaphysics, as 
the field begins to re-examine the essence of its own core concerns, including 
information, systems and technology. What is information? What is technology? As a 
field, we are still working on the answers to these questions (Lee, 2010; McKinney & 
Yoos, 2010; Boell, 2017; Mingers, 1995; Mingers & Standing, 2017). Answers to these 
questions on the philosophy of information (Floridi, 2002; Floridi, 2011) and 
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technology (Feenberg, 1991; Feenberg, 2010b; Ihde, 1990; Ihde, 1993) are being 
provided by scholars outside of IS. The ongoing struggle to define the IT artefact 
(Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001; Akhlaghpour et al., 2013; Alter, 2015), is in fact, a 
struggle that metaphysics offers several opportunities, despite the dearth of such studies 
in IS. 
One such opportunity that overlaps with metaphysics is the philosophy of technology 
which, despite being a late comer, has built a long tradition within critical studies in 
philosophy (Feenberg, 1991; Ihde, 1979; Ihde, 1990; Ihde, 1993; Hacking, 1983; Dusek, 
2006; Mitcham, 1994). Contradicting the traditional view that technologies are neutral 
tools and merely the result of human decisions and agency, philosophers of technology 
such as Marcuse (1964), Ellul (1973) and Winner (1977; 1989) elaborate on the non-
neutral and political essence of technology which, when escalated to certain levels of 
complexity and interrelatedness, creates indelible marks on society. Winner (1989) 
argues that technologies are not mere aids but are powerful forces acting to reshape 
human activity, create new cultures and new worlds, which no longer becoming causal 
in a linear way, resulting in unpredictable and even disruptive consequences. Borgmann 
(1984) goes further and distinguishes modern technologies from older technologies and 
discusses the “device paradigm” (p. 4) of new technologies which, instead of 
disburdening citizens threatens that which enriches life - what Borgmann calls “focal 
things and practices” (p. 4). We are realizing, albeit with some trepidation 
(McGranahan, 2017), what has already been noted by earlier philosophers of 
technology, that technologies appear to have moral significance (Verbeek, 2011). All of 
these multidimensional aspects of technology appear to be lost within IS circles, trapped 
within traditional notions of technology and its features and characteristics, as they 
attempt to describe the “IT artefact” using its secondary qualities and nomological 
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implications. The philosophy of science and philosophy of technology circles are only 
recently catching up and this gap in the progress of understanding technology, 
especially information technology, and this state of affairs offers the IS field an 
unprecedented opportunity to demonstrate its contribution to society, if only it can 
engage with metaphysics seriously (see article in this issue on the future of IS based on 
the philosophy of technology). 
Epistemology: Why do we think we know and the problem of epistemology in IS 
Epistemology is less of an issue in the natural sciences as it is in the social sciences. 
There was always a kind of an assumed boundary between these two scientific fields 
until the 1950s and 1960s (Kuhn, 1957; Kuhn, 1962; Merton, 1957) when several 
philosophers and sociologists began suggesting that they held some epistemological 
authority to the natural sciences, and hence was born terms such as the “sociology of 
science and knowledge” and “social construction of reality,” which have to a large 
extent, become the received view of reality in IS (Hirschheim, 1985). Since science and 
knowledge are seen as social conventions, the how-to gain knowledge task of 
epistemology became more problematic and, not surprisingly, became somewhat of an 
obsession for IS researchers throughout its early history from the 1980s (Mumford et 
al., 1985; Hirschheim & Klein, 2012) through the turn of the century (see Mingers 
(2003)), especially in deciding, of the many ‘reference disciplines’ (Baskerville & 
Myers, 2002; Keen, 1980), which should best inform IS research. The realisation of the 
importance of epistemology for both research but also for practice sits behind the slogan 
of “epistemology matters” (Wastell & White, 2010) and the discussions about what 
constitute truth and knowledge. Is it the consensus of the community of competent 
speakers, as discourse theory would suggest (Habermas, 1981)? Is it the coherence of 
statements within a larger axiomatic framework, as we know it from mathematical 
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reasoning? Is it the successful practice that truth facilitates, as pragmatism would 
suggest (James, 1907)? As if these questions were not difficult enough, it is now well-
established in IS and beyond that truth is not a value-neutral absolute term, but that it is 
political, contested and the basis of power, as Foucault (1980) has shown with his ideas 
of regimes of truth. This political component of truth and knowledge is highly relevant 
and questions the idea that information systems are containers of truths (James, 1907; 
Introna, 2003; Willcocks, 2004). 
 
What has happened since these discussions have taken place is the establishment 
of so-called “paradigms” acting as proxy templates for IS research methods and the 
ensuing skirmishes between those who prefer one over the other (Mingers, 2004). Not 
only have these efforts and overemphasis on methods and methodologies 
misappropriated the Kuhnian concept of the “paradigm” and what it stands for in 
research (Hassan, 2014; Hassan & Mingers, in print), they have restricted epistemology 
to methods and deflected the attention of IS researchers away from their core concerns – 
the object of their study. The received view of paradigms in IS creates artificial 
epistemological boundaries between research groups as if these divisions exhaustively 
describe the nature of the research or the complexity of the real world. As a result of 
these artificial boundaries, it became necessary to justify the need for apparently 
incongruous terms such as “positivist case studies,” (Dubé & Paré, 2003; Sarker & Lee, 
2002) “interpretivist surveys” or “mixed-method research” (Venkatesh et al., 2013; 
Mingers, 2001; Mingers, 2003) or similar approaches that place the focus on the method 
rather than on the object of study. Novel approaches in IS such as critical realism and 
phronesis (explained in this issue) defy such restrictive epistemological categories. 
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If these restrictive categories become a disservice to researchers and yet, epistemology 
matters, where and how does it play a role in research? Its critical role is realized only 
when it is conceived to be closely related to all the other philosophical fields such as 
metaphysics, axiology and rationality. For how can one study something, when the 
essence or metaphysics of what to study is as yet underdetermined? How can one be 
sure of the knowledge surrounding IT strategy for example, if both “IT” and “strategy” 
can take different forms depending on who is researching, which articles are relied on, 
and how they are conceived? It is in these situations that philosophy offers solutions and 
alternatives.  
The relationships between philosophy and methods are not as contrived or mechanical 
as is commonly viewed in IS. Doctoral students are often asked before embarking on 
their research, what methods they are choosing—positivist or interpretivist? What 
ontology – realist or idealist – is their research based on? As is found in research 
textbooks (e.g. Creswell (2003) and Crotty (1998)), epistemology implies theoretical 
perspectives (positivism or interpretivism) which in turn dictates a particular research 
method. The domain in which the research resides, whether it is quantitative or 
qualitative, is at best not a productive way to begin the research (Cook & Reichardt, 
1979; Reichardt & Rallis, 1994). Notwithstanding the political and sociological 
demands that researchers face, starting with a focus on the metaphysics of the problem, 
coupled with clear research questions, and a judicious use of epistemological choices, 
will best serve the researcher. 
Logic, Rationality and the Reasoning Process  
Closely intertwined with knowledge and knowing, as defined by epistemology, are the 
logical processes we use to acquire knowledge. Logic, which in Greek literally means 
“the word,” has come to represent the study of good reasoning by valid inference and 
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demonstration. Reasoning represents the thinking process and logic supplies the rules 
by which we know that our thinking process can be trusted. Reasoning processes that 
take the shape of claims become arguments, and logic supplies the rules and criteria for 
valid arguments. As Lee and Hubona (2009) emphasize, research, regardless whether 
they are quantitative or qualitative, are always founded on some form of argument. 
Therefore, the validity and quality of that research is predicated on the validity and 
quality of the logic and argument presented, and as they demonstrate, even articles in 
the top IS journal are not immune to logical inconsistencies. If every day societal 
debates and concerns are replete with logical inconsistencies and fallacies (Engel, 
1999), which become the source of conflict and discord (e.g. the the oft-repeated slogan 
“guns don’t kill people, people kill people” when examined is both obscurum per 
obscurius – failure to elucidate, and ignoratio elenchi – red herring), what of more 
complex arguments offered in research? Researchers and journal editors need to be 
more sensitive to how arguments are framed to avoid falling into those same traps and 
protect the integrity and validity of that research. 
 
The bulk of the reasoning process applied in IS research is deductive reasoning, 
stemming from the prevalence of the practice of the hypothetico-deductive method 
(Chen & Hirschheim, 2004) within the field that seeks scientific certainty. Besides its 
susceptibility to fallacious arguments, one major weakness of deductive reasoning that 
relies solely on the premises is that it is non-ampliative (Gauch, 2003), or not inherently 
built with a generative or imaginative component. What this means is deductive logic 
cannot infer anything beyond the data provided by its premises. The conclusion of 
deductive logic is limited to its premises and coupled with the tendency of the IS field 
to excessively borrow from its reference disciplines (Hassan, 2011), the extensive use of 
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deductive logic is not likely to benefit from information beyond what already exists 
within the field or within its reference disciplines. This recipe for research puts severe 
limitations on creative theorizing. Other forms of reasoning such as inductive reasoning 
and abductive reasoning are inherently ampliative. Thus, in grounded theory, which is 
built on the inductive reasoning process, Glaser (1978) recommends reading outside the 
researcher’s domain in order to creatively make analogous linkages that will help 
generate new ideas and concepts. Similarly, critical realism (see Williams and Wynn, 
this issue) encourages the use of reasoning processes such as retroduction, which is 
similar to Piercean abductive reasoning, to widen the diversity of possibilities for 
explaining the phenomena of interest. Indeed, specific areas in reasoning, such as causal 
reasoning, although introduce earlier on in IS history (Markus & Robey, 1988), are 
being re-examined in light of the conundrum surrounding the value of theoretical 
contribution in IS research (Markus & Rowe, forthcoming). 
 
Such reasoning processes when linked to the context of the researcher, 
determines the rational bases for the researcher’s reasoning. Because rationality is 
defined as the combination of reasoning in a way that is sanctioned by norms, and for 
achieving one’s goals (Evans & Over, 1996), reasoning itself is not inherently tied to 
rationality. Thus, when a researcher decides to work on certain research topics that are 
more likely to get published regardless of the level of interest for that topic, Max Weber 
(1978) defines such a type as purposive or instrumental rationality. Because rationality 
is closely tied to the context of the person’s goals, others may find their decisions 
irrational. Jurgen Habermas (1971) notes: “the choice of rationality over dogmatism 
must itself either be rationally justified, in which case rationality is committed, or be 
itself dogmatic” Towards a Rational Society, 1971. Karl Popper (1966) says: “There are 
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other tenable attitudes, notably that of critical rationalism, which recognises the fact that 
the fundamental rationalist attitude results from an act of faith – from faith in reason. … 
This is a moral decision” The Open Society and its Enemies II, 1966, p. 231. In other 
words, both argue that it is not possible to rationally justify rationality, it must 
ultimately be a decision based on personal faith or belief. 
 
There are those, particularly from postmodernism or post-structuralism, who 
suggest that such is the case with how we instinctively rationalize. For example, Derrida 
(1978) claims that almost all our thinking, and hence our research, is riddled, if not 
vitiated by unjustified or unhelpful privileging of one thing over another. Derrida (1976) 
shows that historically, Western philosophy had essentially privileged speech, which is 
considered authentic communication, over writing, which is considered a transcript of 
that authentic speech, somewhat like a second-hand report of the original, lacking the 
interaction and authenticity that comes with conversation. Just like speech is privileged 
over writing, reason is privileged over intuition; men for long periods of history, over 
women; words over images; or sight over faith (as in, I’ll believe it when I see it). In IS 
research, we do this when our top journals prefer the safety of positivistic research over 
other epistemological approaches (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004). Or when we adhere to 
proven research scripts (Grover & Lyytinen, 2015) or accepted research genres (Avital 
et al., 2017).   
 
Derrida’s point is that this privileging involves the failure to see the merits and 
value of the supposedly lesser side of the equation, and that the key counterparts of 
what we consider to be lesser is worthy of our attention and even support. To resolve 
this problem, Derrida (1978) proposes the notion of deconstruction, a way of thinking 
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which dismantles any loyalty we might have with any idea and seeking aspects of truth 
that may lie buried in its alleged opposite. The uniqueness and messiness of each 
situation has to be given its due consideration. And to deconstruct any idea is to admit 
that often it is confused and riddled with logical defects. 
 
Relating this discussion back to IS research, as researchers, we need to admit 
that behind every problem, there is not necessarily a perfectly neat solution, and need to 
be cured from the love of crude simplicity, and the constant craving for them may lie 
the root of our problems. As researchers, we need to be comfortable with the 
permanently oscillating nature of wisdom. An admission to this situation of aporia, 
another term Derrida made famous that means impasse or puzzlement, is a state of mind 
that Derrida says we should be proud to visit often, because rather than admitting to 
being in a state of doubt or confusion, it is a state where we start asking questions, make 
inquiries and embark on a journey of understanding. Like the IS field, the management 
field too finds a paucity of discussions on these reasoning processes notwithstanding the 
massive volumes of research that have been devoted to rationality and the implications 
of cognitive limits (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013). Despite the vast implications they hold 
for all aspects of research including research arguments, theories and theorizing, 
discussions on logic, rationality and the reasoning process have perhaps been taken for 
granted in the IS field. As Habermas (1996, p. 306) once said, we should be leveraging 
the “unforced force of the better argument,” and philosophy provides the necessary 
resources for the better argument to prevail. 
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Axiology: What is good and to be valued, and what 
should we do and why should we do it? 
Research, by many accounts, is not just about the nature of reality and how we can 
know anything about it, but also about how we evaluate it. We use the term ‘axiology’ 
here to denote the branch of philosophy that deals with values, including those of ethics, 
aesthetics, or religion (Rescher, 2005). The term is not widely used in the IS discourse, 
but the topics it covers are of crucial importance. If value is what makes something 
desirable, then an understanding of axiology is important for any type of IS research. 
Maximising profits, for example, if this is what an organisation does, expresses a 
specific set of values which need to be understood for the organisation’s actions to be 
plausible. In the field of IS some aspects of axiology are well covered, notably ethics, 
whereas others are less prominent. There is relatively little discussion of aesthetic 
values in IS. Allen Lee (1991) in his discussion of architecture as a reference discipline 
highlighted the importance of aesthetic values. Maybe more importantly, aesthetic 
values influence the design of IS (Cyr et al., 2006) and are therefore of crucial 
importance for the field of IS, but remain under-researched (Tractinsky, 2004). There is 
more explicit discussion of aesthetic values in adjacent fields like human computer 
interaction, for example in terms of the relationship between aesthetics and usability 
(Tuch et al., 2012), but this debate is not reflected in mainstream IS. 
While the discussion of aesthetical values in IS is not well developed, there is a much 
stronger engagement with ethical values in the IS literature.  Ethics is the philosophical 
discipline interested in questions of right and wrong, good and bad, do’s or don’t. One 
key question of ethics is the basis upon which one can determine what is good, which is 
in many cases linked to a metaphysical position (Moore, 1993, p.110). Ethics has been a 
key concern in philosophy since Antiquity and in many philosophical systems it has 
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been the key question (Nussbaum, 2009). One way of classifying ethical theories is by 
looking at their relationship to some of the dominant traditions, notably virtue ethics, 
duty ethics (deontology) and consequentialism. Virtue ethics seeks to answer the 
question what is good by focusing on the character of the agent in question. Strongly 
associated with classical Greek philosophy and in particular Aristotle (Aristotle, 1934), 
virtue ethics locates the good in the reasoned character of the agent who knows to avoid 
the extremes to act virtuously. The deontological tradition, on the other hand, looks for 
the good in the motivation of the agent. The key proponent of this type of thinking is 
Immanuel Kant (1788; 1797) who believed that the agent’s duty can be deduced from 
reason. The key formulation of this idea can be found in the Categorical Imperative that 
holds that one should “Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law” (translation according to (Bowie, 1999, p. 14)). 
The third frequently cited stream of ethical theories builds on the insight that 
determining good and bad needs to take into considerations the consequences of acts. 
This type of reasoning, often called consequentialist is strongly linked with the 
utilitarian tradition and individuals like Mill (1861) and Bentham (1780/2007).  
This set of three ethical theories or family of theories does not cover all possible 
theories, but it has been very influential in informing the debate about the ethics of 
computing. Considerations of ethics of computing can be traced back to the early days 
of digital computing (Wiener, 1954). This has led to the development an ongoing 
discourse around computer ethics (Bynum, 2015; Bynum & Rogerson, 2003) and 
information ethics (Capurro, 2006; Floridi, 1999). The discussion of ethical questions in 
IS has been informed to some degree by computer and information ethics but it has also 
developed its own flavour of the debate. The probably most prominent contribution to 
ethics in IS by Mason (1986) who defined the topics of the debate using the acronym 
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PAPA (privacy, accuracy, property, accessibility) for years to come and it remains 
highly influential. There is a rich history of dealing with ethics in IS (Stahl, 2012a) 
which tends to focus on particular issues such as data protection (Culnan & Williams, 
2009; Dulipovici & Baskerville, 2007) or professional behaviour (Stoodley et al., 2010) 
(Towell et al., 2004). There is also some debate about ethical theories and their 
relevance to IS (Bull, 2009; Mingers & Walsham, 2010; Walsham, 1996). 
What all of these ethical discussions in IS have in common and share with most of the 
traditional philosophical ethical discourse is an assumption of a relatively low epistemic 
and normative uncertainty. This means that the consequences of actions are predictable 
and that there is a relatively high level of agreement on the principles of what counts as 
good or bad. Both of these assumptions are increasingly open to doubt. The rapid spread 
of current and emerging ICTs through society and the increasing capabilities of these 
new technologies render it difficult to ascertain facts and their moral evaluation. A good 
example of that is the current discussion around artificial intelligence. It is not always 
easy to distinguish hype and fiction from factual descriptions and there is often little 
agreement on whether novel technologies, such as autonomous cars, are acceptable or 
under which conditions they would be. 
 
Another recent phenomenon that puts the assumption that ethical discourse is of a low 
epistemic and normative significance is the high rate of consumption of fake news and 
its debilitating effects (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). This phenomenon not only refers to 
epistemological questions but had a direct impact on what should count as a right and 
appropriate course of action. Fake news is closely related to questions of political 
action, given the highly visible use of US president Trump’s use of the term (Lanktree, 
2018). It also spills over into questions of manipulation of the electorate which several 
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organisations are accused of, notably the UK company Cambridge Analytica and their 
unauthorised use of psychographics on more than 87 million Facebook users 
(Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018). The psychologist and neuroscientist who 
supplied Cambridge Analytica with his research went through a review board and 
followed the necessary ethical rules, but nevertheless was not aware that the research 
was used for illegal and unethical use. As a result of these events, ethical rules as they 
apply to academicians are being reexamined (Editorials Nature, 2018). Despite over a 
decade of research in privacy and security of information in IS (Acquisti & Gross, 2006; 
Lowry et al., 2017; Posey et al., 2017), we cannot assume that the problem is solved. A 
new approach to privacy and security may be necessary to overcome these challenges.  
This “weaponization of information” (Waltzman, 2017), the ability for mass 
manipulation by rogue elements to gain an advantage over others, shows the direct link 
between the axiological issues of ethics, good and right and politics. This link was well 
accepted in classical philosophy and this traditional link seems to be revived in 21st 
century socio-technical reality. However, the field of IS does not seem well equipped to 
deal with these challenges. Where in the past the focus of the field may have been 
predominantly on organisational use of ICT, the dividing line between organisational, 
personal and societal use is now much more difficult to draw. Similarly, it has become 
more difficult to determine what counts as an information system. Uncertainty and risk 
have long been a compounding factor of ethical debates, but they are now turning into a 
constitutive part of ethics. 
 
This means that ethical questions now require a more explicit metaphysical and 
epistemological discussion. In order to determine what is good, we need to know what 
is. And, to make matters worse, these discussions often have to be undertaken before 
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there can be certainty concerning the capabilities of new technologies. Current debates 
of the role that IT play in society would benefit greatly from the expertise that the IS 
community has built up over a long period. But this implies that IS scholars explicitly 
engage with these questions. A better understanding of axiological questions can help IS 
scholars to identify relevant positions and contribute to the debate. Even more 
importantly, this axiological understanding needs to be embedded in consistent 
metaphysical and epistemological positions. This can then inform practical 
interventions where axiological insights can be used to inform practical debates that aim 
to shape policy, political practice and public discourses. 
Moving Forward 
It is reasonable to assume that people are rightly confused about the merits of capitalism 
and socialism or in the case of IS research, between positivism and non-positivists, 
between diversity or unity, between rigor and relevance, between theory-heavy and 
theory-light research or whatever central issue that’s captured the minds of IS 
researchers; so we should not rush to any conclusions on these topics before examining 
what useful things can be said about both sides of the alleged divide. To conclude that 
one or the other is good or bad, or that one has no relationship to the other is to be 
dismissive of the complex and kaleidoscopic nature of life and reality. 
 
This is what writing philosophy is all about. Granted, many important principles 
depend on logic, and rational thinking, and rely on language as a means of 
communication, but an overreliance on logic, i.e., being overly logocentric, prevents us 
from understanding other important principles and values that cannot be simply 
communicated with logic or words, but require a treasure of background knowledge and 
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the ability to go beyond the logic and embrace equally if not more important aspects of 
life and living. Someone who is capable of solving a mathematical equation tells us very 
little about that person’s ability to make a success out of a marriage, business or 
academic relationships. Not overly relying on logic doesn’t imply relativism or 
incoherence. Coherency is the hallmark of scholarship. What’s required to open one’s 
mind to the possibility of a different but nevertheless coherent thought. 
 
The first step in opening up our minds to alternative thinking is to identify what 
Derrida calls the centre which everything that is significant refers to. In the case of IS, 
the philosophical centre that has guided IS research for many years was and is 
positivism. Although other centres have attempted to decentre it, they have made only 
modest progress; thus, other research approaches such as interpretivism or critical 
theory can only command a limited amount of influence in structuring how IS research 
proceeds. As Derrida says, with that centre, there is a lack of play possible within the 
field since everything needs to refer back to that original centre that guarantees all the 
signifiers’ ontological fixity and stability. This traditional understanding goes all the 
way back to Descarte’s notion of the cogito that fixes the absolute space for everything 
else. It is convenient for researchers because it projects a ready-made template that can 
be easily imitated and recognized as being the standard method. This tendency towards 
a standard method in the form of epistemology is a natural development of any field on 
the road towards maturity; however, as a result, the meaning of IS research is therefore 
fixed to specific research archetypes, bounded and traditional to that eidos (intellectual 
character) of the field. Notwithstanding this preferred orthodoxy, there is a greater issue 
at stake, that is less a matter of choosing between positivism or other approaches and 
more of an attitude towards research that favours the “safe” mechanical research 
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approach that seemingly guarantees results. Such tendencies exists even in non-
positivist research, for as Myers and Klein (2011, p. 18) note, “We also caution against 
our principles being used in a mechanistic manner … scholars need to exercise their 
judgement and discretion in deciding whether, how, and which of the principles should 
be applied in any given research project.” Such a state of affairs engenders an inability 
for the IS field to be “box breaking,” impactful or innovative in its studies. There will 
always be a need to introduce or improve on methods but, at the same time, if those 
methods are not applied or applied in a sterile, mechanical manner, progress will be 
disproportionally less than the effort expended. As Roszak (1972, p. 202) succinctly 
describes this over-emphasis on method:  
The methodologies of a Max Weber or a Freud yield brilliant insights only 
in the hands of a Weber or a Freud; in the hands of lesser talents, they yield 
what may be less worth having than the blunders of a great mind. One might 
almost suspect that methodology is the preoccupation of mediocrity, the 
dullard's great hope of equalling the achievements of the gifted 
Writing philosophy is the exact opposite of such a strategy in research, for there can 
never be a cookie-cutter way to philosophize. An image of what philosophy in IS entails 
is needed to discourage the kind of mimicry that Roszak talks about. Alternative 
reasoning processes are slowly gaining ground in IS research.. Many of these alternative 
reasoning, argumentation and rhetorical styles are being welcomed into the IS field. A 
special issue in the European Journal of Information Systems (Avital et al., 2017) on 
“Alternative Genres in Information Systems Research” introduces to the IS community 
various literary and narrative rhetorical styles that are suited for philosophical 
argumentation. These literary and narrative-type argumentation styles, which are briefly 
discussed in this section, are less popular among IS authors, despite their suitability for 
the subject-matter of IS-the human and social side of the IS phenomena. 
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Synopsis of Articles 
Our call for papers for this Special Issue generated considerable interest, with over 40 
submissions, in many varying philosophical topics ranging from metaphysical topics 
discussing the nature of IT and IS, theories and theorizing, and proposing various 
epistemological approaches. The quality of the discourse of the submissions was 
impressive and given the limited space allowed for the Special Issue, it was a challenge 
to choose just six articles. The authors of these six articles represented both senior 
scholars in IS as well as younger authors, a result that is very gratifying to witness, 
given the goals of Special Issue to encourage younger authors and novel thinking in IS 
philosophy. The editors also took pains to ensure that the language of the articles in the 
Special Issue is accessible to all IS researchers regardless of their background in 
philosophy. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Articles 
Title Authors Focus Contribution 
The IT Artefact and 
its Spirit: A Nexus 
of Human Values, 
Affordances, 
Symbolic 








Offers a solution to the 
problems surrounding the 
conceptualization of the IT 
artefact by integrating 
features, symbolic 
expressions and affordances 
into values within a specified 
context that together emerge 
as the essence of IT in terms 
of its “spirit.” 
What's in a Face? 
Making Sense of 
Tangible 
Information 










alternative that views the IT 
artefact as an emergent and 
dynamic IS artefact instead 
of configurable stable 
bundles of hardware and 
software 
Critical Realist 








Argues for how critical 





Jr. Rationality approaches within IS that 
lack diversity and practical 
relevance, excessively 
borrow, and inadequately 
internalize IT  













Applies an explicit 
analogical reasoning to build 
a foundation based on 
Michel Foucault’s liberal 


















Discusses how a third type of 
knowledge, Aristotle’s 
phronesis, informs the ethical 
application of episteme 
(sciences) and techne 
(technology) and addresses 
the increasingly problematic 
value conflicts arising from 















Draws on critical theory of 
technology, in particular 
Feenberg’s work, to 
demonstrate how IS research 
can and should take into 
consideration future, using 
the example of big data 
analysis. 
 
The IT Artefact and its Spirit: A Nexus of Human Values, Affordances, 
Symbolic Expressions, and IT Features 
The synopsis begins with the article that discusses the “first philosophy” – metaphysics. 
This article is timely not only because its philosophical subject matter is rarely covered 
in IS research, but also because it applies metaphysics to inform the debate on the IT 
artefact, a core concern that is naturally addressed by metaphysics. This approach to 
understanding technology differs from how the field traditionally understands 
technology – as a bundle of features and secondary qualities—which limits the way of 
thinking of technology to only what is superficially perceptible. As Heidegger (1977) 
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puts it, when we think about a “tree,” we don’t just think about how tall it is, or the 
about the colour of its bark, the essence of the tree goes beyond those features and 
secondary qualities. The ongoing battle between those who reap financial benefits from 
deforestation, and those who oppose it, understand the relationship between trees and 
climate change and find solace and inspiration in trees, illustrates the difference in 
thinking about trees. Similarly, when we think about technology, Heidegger says, it is 
“by no means anything technological” (p. 4). What Heidegger means by this is that we 
miss the point when we merely think of technology as just a means to an end. Our 
connection to and dependence on technology is much more primal, and consequently, 
needs to feature prominently in our research. Technology, as alluded earlier, is not just 
technological, it is social, ethical and imbued with spirit, which is the discussion this 
article explores by linking the technologies secondary qualities and affordances with 
values and spirit. 
What's in a face? Making sense of tangible information systems in terms of 
Peircean semiotics 
Beynon Davies’ article reflects the kind of philosophy that the Special Issue is looking 
for, that is the kind that links metaphysics, epistemology, axiology and rationality into a 
theory that carries implications for many fields. Peirce’s metaphysics rests on his logic 
or rationality, whereas his epistemology, most famously, his version of pragmatism was 
inspired by Kantian epistemology and ethics. In all of his well-known contributions, be 
it semiotics, or logic and abductive reasoning, we see the cross-over from one 
philosophical field to another. Beynon Davies’ article folds all of these philosophical 
inspirations, and specifically semiotics, into design science and demonstrates how 
Peirce’s conceptualization of the sign brings together inquiry, meaning and truth. For 
information systems, this pragmatic approach to philosophy is especially pertinent since 
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Peirce is well trained in the sciences, especially physics, and he constantly applies his 
philosophy to benefit the sciences. Beynon Davies’ article shows how such an approach 
benefits design science and informs our understanding of sociomateriality in the case of 
visual devices. Viewed from the perspective that signs are processes instead of static 
hardware-software artefacts, the IS artefact can be research as an emergent 
phenomenon. 
Critical Realist Scripts for Creative Theorizing in Information Systems 
Addressing the perennial issues facing the IS field that demonstrate a lack of diversity 
in theories and theorizing, struggle in balancing reference theories with empirics as well 
as bridging with practitioners, and inadequately internalize the information technology 
(IT) artefact into its research, Williams and Wynn propose critical realism as a potential 
solution. Responding to what Grover and Lyytinen call the “dominant epistemic script” 
in IS research that tows the line of the status quo, the authors describe the alternative 
ontological and epistemological foundations that are built into critical realism, which 
links what is observed with causal mechanisms within the observed phenomena through 
a logical process of abduction and retroduction (pulling once again on the philosophy of 
Peirce). As they present their case, the problem of diversity and the balance between 
borrowing theories and empirics is addressed via critical realism’s retroductive process 
of theorizing that forces researchers to find a balance between data-driven theorizing 
and existing theories. The study of the network of causal mechanisms, which include 
the properties and forces embedded in the digital artefacts themselves, enables a focus 
on the technology’s affordances (which links to what the first article discussed) and its 
ongoing interactions with human and social entities, thereby helping to bridge the 
research to practitioner concerns. 
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From sovereign IT governance to liberal IT governmentality? A Foucauldian 
analogy 
Inspired by Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality—the rationality of 
governing—Leclercq-Vandelannoitte and Bertin apply an explicit analogical reasoning 
approach to IT governance to build a solid foundation upon which future research could 
grow. In light of recent events such as the email scandals that derailed the Clinton 
presidential campaign in 2016, the increasing frequency of leaks and data breaches, and 
President Trump’s overindulgence of his Twitter account, the issue of IT governance 
has become increasingly central to the socio-political domain. Yet, IS research has 
made only modest progress on what is arguably the weakest link in the overall internal 
corporate governance structure (Brown & Grant, 2005). The authors propose and argue 
for a liberal model for IT governance based on the Foucauldian concept of power-
knowledge relations that finds a balance between encouraging free, innovative and 
effective use of IT within corporate environments and maintaining regulatory control 
and enhancing accountability. This article also demonstrates an innovative theorizing 
process in the form of explicit analogical reasoning that does not rely on oft-used box-
arrow modelling and diagrams and offers an alternative to developing similarity and 
causal relations between core concepts in a theoretical framework. As a result, core IS 
concepts such as usage are redefined and enhanced. 
Phronesis, Argumentation and Puzzle Solving in IS Research: Illustrating an 
Approach to Phronetic IS Research Practice 
Following from the disruptive and even chaotic consequences of technology on society, 
researchers are finding it difficult to reconcile improvements in productivity and 
efficiency with increasing value conflicts. Knowledge associated with the sciences 
(episteme) and technology (techne) ignores the intricate relationships between 
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consequences of technology and their implications on the value systems and beliefs of 
society. Enter phronesis (practical wisdom), the Aristotelian category of knowledge that 
informs the ethical applications of both science and technology, bringing into the 
discussion what it means to, in a practical sense, act virtuously. The concept of 
phronesis is yet another philosophical concept that cuts across long-held divisions and 
categories in IS research and seeks both individual and social well-being. Phronetic 
research cuts across positivist, interpretivist or critical research divisions, and 
automatically bridges with issues of praxis, for it brings all of their salient points into 
view. It is dialogical, non-dualistic, reflective, hermeneutic and value-laden; yet at the 
same time incorporates the principles of empirical analysis that is the bedrock of 
positivist science. Its concern with details and particulars makes it amenable to 
substantive theory development. Following the manner in which Stephen Toulmin and 
Bent Flyvbjerg, and to a lesser extent Hans-Georg Gadamer, develop Aristotle’s 
concept of phronesis, the authors study the case of the failure of a German digitized 
drug-dispensing infrastructure designed to reduce non-compliance amongst patients 
using individualized medication blisters. The phronetic analysis of the national initiative 
demonstrates how, despite evidence of enhanced effectiveness of the proposed project, 
opponents of the project were able to develop a narrative, with its own demonstrable 
evidence, to undermine and delegitimize the proposed project, despite clear economic 
efficiencies, improved visibility, and prevention of adverse drug interactions built into 
the digital infrastructure. 
Philosophical foundations for informing the future(s) through IS research 
One of the glaring ironies of the study of technology in the IS field is the dearth of any 
philosophy of technology. Not surprisingly, IS scholars continue to lament the minimal 
attention that the field has paid to technology itself (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001; 
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Akhlaghpour et al., 2013). The article by Davidson, Chiasson & Winter directly 
addresses this gap. They frame their paper in terms of the responsibilities of IS 
researchers with regards to the outcomes of their work on sociotechnical practices, and 
apply Feenberg’s (2010a; 2010b) critical philosophy of technology that distinguishes 
between technologies that embed technical rationality from technologies that embed 
underlying societal values, interests, and priorities. They achieve this by drawing on 
existing future and foresight studies and integrating those with ideas about the 
potentiality and actuality of technology as developed by Feenberg. These ideas which 
were introduced under the concept of responsible research and innovation in IS (Stahl, 
2012b; Stahl et al., 2014) are then illustrated using examples from big data research.  
We hope that the set of papers brought together in this special issue demonstrate the 
significance and importance of philosophical work in IS. They draw from different 
philosophical fields and provide important bases for existing and future research. We 
hope this brief introduction to the potential of philosophy in IS will inspire a stream of 
research that will locate IS research as a major reference discipline for studies in novel 
and emerging technologies. 
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